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INTRODUCTION
From the end of October 1929 to the end of November 1929, the
stock market lost over one hundred billion dollars in value.1 At the
time, the loss represented over thirty times the entire federal budget of
three billion dollars.2 By 1933, the nadir of the Great Depression,
nearly 1,700 state chartered savings and loans had failed,3 and almost
half of all home loans were in default.4 Compounding the crisis, the
*

J.D. candidate, May 2008, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; B.A. English, B.S.Ch.E., May 2001, Rice University. The author would
like to thank his friends and family who have supported him through school, career
changes, and even more school. The author also wishes to especially thank those
people who provided much helpful criticism for this Note.
1
CNN.com, October 29, 1929: “Black Tuesday”, http://www.cnn.com/2003/
US/03/10/sprj.80.1929.crash/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2007).
2
NEW YORK: A DOCUMENTARY FILM (PBS 2007).
3
WFS Fin. Inc. v. Dean, 79 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1026 (W.D. Wis. 1999).
4
In re Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC Mortgage Servicing Litig., 491 F.3d 638,
641-42 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458
U.S.141, 159 (1982).). The case name changed between the district court opinion
and the Seventh Circuit opinion because Ocwen changed its name and charter. In
future short citations, the district court case, In re Ocwen Federal Bank FSB
Mortgage Servicing Litig., No. MDL 1604, 04-C-2714, 2006 WL 794739, at *4 n.2
(March 22, 2006)., is referred to as “In re Ocwen I.” The Seventh Circuit opinion, In
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average household owed almost 20% of its income to creditors—an
increase of over 10% from 1929.5 Forty-five percent of all farm
mortgages were in default and home mortgage defaults were above
38% in over half of twenty-two metropolitan areas.6 Ten million
people were unemployed, and nearly four and a half million people
had lost their homes and were living in the streets.7
Many modern economists believe that the severity of the Great
Depression is partly explained by the collapse of the banking system.8
Afraid of runs and the increasing defaults on their balance sheets,
bankers further tightened credit—hoarding cash to remain solvent, but
depressing macroeconomic output and worsening the economic
depression in the process.9
During the Great Depression, Congress attempted to save the
failing banking industry, expand credit, and prevent millions more
people from being forced into the streets by enacting the Home
Owners’ Loan Act of 1933 (“HOLA”).10 HOLA restored confidence in
the banking industry and to end what President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt called the rapid “deflation which was depriving [through
re Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC Mortgage Servicing Litig., 491 F.3d 638, 641-42
(7th Cir. 2007), is referred to as “In re Ocwen II.”
5
BENJAMIN BERNANKE, ESSAYS ON THE GREAT DEPRESSION 46 (2000).
6
Id.
7
Franklin Delano Roosevelt Memorial, The Path to Social Justice: Black
Tuesday, http://www.nps.gov/fdrm/generation/btues.htm (last visited Nov. 25,
2007).
8
BERNANKE, supra note 5, at 42-43.
9
Id. It is a situation that bears many similarities to the financial crisis of 2007.
Banks are increasingly taking major writedowns on investments and, if they decide
to maintain traditional debt to capital ratios, it could reduce lending by $2 trillion—
representing a severe tightening in credit in the United States. Bank Capital:
Tightening the Safety Belt, ECONOMIST, Nov. 24, 2007, at 77.
10
Home Owners’ Loan Act of 1933 §1, 12 U.S.C. § 1461 (2000). HOLA and
the OTS only authorize and regulate federal S&Ls, not federal banks. Federal banks
are chartered under the National Bank Act and administered by the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”). Practically, there is little difference between
S&Ls and banks, but the OTS mandate is much broader than the OCC’s. See
Andrew T. Reardon, An Examination of Recent Preemption Issues in Banking Law,
90 IOWA L. REV. 347, 363-64 (2004).
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default and subsequent foreclosure] many millions of farm and home
owners from the title and equity to their property.”11
HOLA created a federally backed and administered system of
savings and loans (“S&Ls”), and created what is now the Office of
Thrift Supervision (“OTS”).12 The OTS is the agency charged with
developing and administering regulations that provide for the
“examination, safe and sound operation, and regulation of [S&Ls].”13
Congress gave the OTS “the plenary and full authority . . . to regulate
all aspects of the operations of Federal [S&Ls].”14 The OTS’ “plenary
and full” authority means its regulations are “preemptive of any state
law purporting to address the subject of the operations of a Federal
savings association.”15 This authority allows the OTS to preempt state
laws and regulate “the powers and operations of every Federal [S&L]
from its cradle to its corporate grave.”16 State regulations and common
law actions are valid only if they“incidentally affect the lending
operations of Federal [S&Ls],” as required by the OTS preemption
regulation, 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(c).17
Courts have generally interpreted HOLA and the OTS’
implementing regulations to pre-empt almost all claims against federal
S&Ls.18 Even when federal law or the regulations do not provide a

11

Signing statement of Franklin D. Roosevelt on HOLA, June 13, 1933, in THE
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT (John Woolley and Gerhard Peters, eds.),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=14665 (last visited Nov. 25, 2007).
12
See 12 U.S.C. § 1462(4) (2000). The administrative agency has had several
names since its inception. The most recent change was in 1989, when Congress
renamed it the OTS. In re Ocwen Federal Bank FSB Mortgage Servicing Litig., No.
MDL 1604, 04-C-2714, 2006 WL 794739, at *4 n.2 (March 22, 2006). For
consistency, OTS is used to refer to the agency or any of its predecessors.
13
12 U.S.C. § 1463(a)(1) (2000).
14
12 C.F.R. § 545.2 (2007).
15
Id.
16
Fid. Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 145 (1982)
(internal quotations and citations omitted).
17
12 C.F.R. § 560.2(c) (2007).
18
See de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 151, n.9 (providing a survey of relevant federal
and state cases where state law was preempted by OTS regulations).
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private cause of action, the courts generally do not assert jurisdiction19
because “[e]ven the States’ salutary effort to redress private wrongs . .
. cannot be exerted to regulate activities that are potentially subject to
the exclusive federal regulatory scheme.”20 Under much of the federal
courts’ jurisprudence, national banks are exempt from state regulation
unless Congress or the OTS explicitly authorizes the state regulation.21
Recently, the Seventh Circuit decided In re Ocwen Loan
Servicing, LLC Mortgage Servicing Litigation (“In re Ocwen II”).22 In
it, the court explicitly rejected the OTS’ analysis of its own preemption
regulation (12 C.F.R. §560.2), and expanded what actions only
“incidentally affect” S&L operations.23 The court refused to dismiss
the state and common law claims as preempted under HOLA.24 The
opening, though limited, allows for some private actions against
federal S&Ls and creates a less deferential test for what only
incidentally affects a federal S&L.25
Part I of this Note provides an overview of the historical
development of the courts’ extremely deferential attitude towards
HOLA and the OTS regulations, and the courts’ willingness to find in
favor of preemption. Part II traces the procedural history and holding
of In re Ocwen, and analyzes the court’s reasoning and support for
creating a modified analytical framework for judging when state law
claims are allowable. Part III discusses the competing interests on both
sides of the state law preemption debate, and discusses how allowing
19

Silvas v. E*Trade Mortgage Corp., 421 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1320 (S.D. Cal.

2006).
20

Id. (quoting San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247
(1959)); see also Haehl v. Wash. Mut. Bank, F.A., 277 F. Supp. 2d 933, 942 (S.D.
Ind. 2003) (State tort law can only be applied to federal S&Ls when it “incidentally
affects” lending operations and will not prove to be a regulation on a preempted
area.); but see Barnett Bank v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 33 (1996) (State regulation of
federal thrifts is permissible only when it “does not prevent or significantly interfere
with the national bank’s exercise of its powers.”).
21
Evan B. Berg, Interstate Banking and Consumer Protection: Curtailing the
Comptroller’s Preemption Power, 15 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 497, 502 (1996).
22
491 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2007).
23
See generally id.
24
Id.
25
Id.
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additional state regulation and private causes of actions could both
help and hinder consumer protection. Finally, Part IV concludes that
Judge Posner and the Seventh Circuit reached the correct conclusion in
the case and that, on balance, some limited state regulation of federal
S&Ls will make the system stronger as a whole.
PART I: THE COMPLETE HISTORY OF U.S. FEDERAL BANKS (ABRIDGED)
For most of the history of the United States, the federal
government has had a love/hate relationship with the idea of a national
banking system; popular fears of large banks and “trusts” resulted in
numerous state and federal laws restricting branch banking.26 The law
and competition between state and national banking schemes kept the
barriers for banking entry low and encouraged the growth of small,
independent banks.27 Traditionally, bank failures in the United States
occurred more often than failures in countries with centralized banking
systems.28 Additionally, the smallness of U.S. banks made financial
panics, or “runs,” much more devastating.29 It was not until 1933, after
the collapse of the banking system, that Congress began to seriously
regulate the industry.30 In the years since the New Deal, federal
agencies have increasingly regulated the banking and lending
26

BERNANKE, supra note 5, at 44 (2d prtg. 2004).
Id.
28
Id. at 44-45.
29
Id. A “run” on a bank occurs when depositors are afraid a bank may be
insolvent and move to withdraw their money. A large withdrawal by depositors
forces the bank to quickly liquidate assets. If the forced liquidation price is
significantly lower than the assets’ value, the bank may suffer financial losses and
actually cause the bank to fail. Id. at 45.
30
The New Deal saw the rise of the administrative state. Beyond HOLA, these
New Deal laws included the Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 77(a) (1933) (regulating the sale of securities); the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78a) (1934)
(creating the Securities and Exchange Commission); the Glass-Steagall Act, 12
U.S.C. § 377 (1933) (repealed by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley (Financial
Modernization) Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1341 (1999)) (creating the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and dividing banks into commercial and
investment enterprises).
27
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industry.31 In the case of S&Ls, however, courts have adopted an
extremely deferential attitude to regulations from the OTS.32
A. Historical Development of the National Banking System
Almost since the inception of the United States, the government
has fought over whether or not a national bank was necessary. George
Washington signed the charter for the First National Bank in 1791,
although he had doubts that a national bank was constitutional.33 As
originally conceived, the bank had private shareholders in addition to
the U.S. government, and also had greater operating powers than state
banks.34 In 1811, James Madison—a Democratic-Republican—
allowed the Bank’s twenty year charter to lapse.35 Just five years later,
31

See Reardon, supra note 11, at 363-64. Based on the economic evidence
from the period, the slow financial recovery after the March 1933 “bank holiday”
would have been must more difficult without extensive government intervention.
The “bank holiday” was the period in March 1933 when President Roosevelt ordered
all U.S. banks closed (“on holiday”) until the federal government could determine
the bank was solvent. After a bank was reviewed and determined solvent, it was
allowed to reopen for business. See BERNANKE, supra note 5, at 65.
32
Reardon, supra note 11, at 358.
33
R. Seymour Long, Andrew Jackson and the National Bank, 12 THE ENGLISH
HISTORICAL REVIEW 45, 85, 88 (Jan. 1897). Hamilton and other Federalists saw the
banks as necessary to create their vision of America as a commercial empire. For
Hamilton, the bank offered the benefits of a uniform paper currency, better
administration of public finances, more efficient tax collection, and a stronger
national economy. TREASURY DEP’T (Alexander Hamilton), REPORT ON THE BANK
OF THE UNITED STATES (1790), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE AND DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES: INCLUDING THE ORIGINAL BANK OF
NORTH AMERICA (Matthew St. Clair Clarke & David A. Hall, eds., 1832), at 15.
Jefferson and the Democratic-Republicans saw the federal government as having
more limited powers. See Jefferson Versus Hamilton on the Bank of the United
States, in AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY, at 137 (Kermit L. Hall et al., eds., 2005)
[hereinafter Jefferson v. Hamilton]. The Democratic-Republicans believed that since
the Constitution did not expressly grant the power to establish a national bank,
banking was a state issue and a national bank was unconstitutional. Long, supra note
33, at 88. See Reardon, supra note 11, at 350-51.
34
See Jefferson v. Hamilton, supra note 33, at 137.
35
Long, supra note 33, at 88.
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however, Madison chartered the Second National Bank to help
underwrite the War of 1812.36 In 1819 the U.S. Supreme Court agreed
to hear a constitutional challenge to the bank’s right to exist.37 The
Court first enumerated the idea of implied federal powers in the
Constitution and held that the federal government had the authority to
create national banks and to preempt state laws attempting to regulate
them.38 It was not until 1832 that the national banking system was
again challenged.
Andrew Jackson—the first Democratic president—was a staunch
opponent of the national bank.39 Jackson vetoed the legislation that
would have renewed the Second National Bank’s charter and wrote an
impassioned veto statement denouncing the bank as unconstitutional.40
When the Second Bank’s charter expired in 1836, the area of “free” or
“wildcat” banking began.41 The era was characterized by state
regulated banks that created “instability in the nation’s currency and
frequent bank failures.”42 The idea of federally authorized banks
would not arise again until the Civil War.43 The Union needed to
finance the Civil War, but could not legally obtain funds in state bank
credit, forcing it to demand payment from banks in gold and tightening
the money supply.44 The National Bank Act of 1864 established a
system of federally regulated national banks capable of printing

36

Id.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
38
Id.
39
Andrew Jackson’s Veto Message July 10, 1832, reprinted in AMERICAN
LEGAL HISTORY, at 161-62 (Kermit L. Hall et al., eds., 2005).
40
Id.
41
Reardon, supra note 11, at 351.
42
Id. at 352.
43
Id.
44
Jonathan R. Macey et al., BANKING LAW AND REGULATION 2-4, at 10 (3d ed.
2001).
37
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money and encouraged state banks to buy government bonds,45 but
they were not a national banking system.46
By the turn of the century, the general sentiment was that
President Jackson’s views were correct.47 The banking system evolved
into that of an “independent treasury” almost exclusively regulated by
the States.48 A series of panics and runs on banks throughout the late
19th and early 20th centuries, however, finally convinced Congress that
a national monetary policy was needed.49 In an effort to provide
greater monetary control over the U.S. banking system, Congress
enacted the Federal Reserve Act of 1913.50 The system set up a
decentralized national monetary system, but still did not provide for
oversight or regulation of individual banks.51 Importantly, the Federal
Reserve was not itself designed to be a consumer bank, but a bank for
banks; it was meant to set broad monetary policy and to be a bank’s
lender of last resort so that the bank could remain solvent.52 Although
the Federal Reserve could set a broad national monetary policy, it
could not ensure that banks operated responsibly.
In 1933, the country had almost reached the nadir of the Great
Depression.53 Following the stock market crash, there had been a run
on banks and credit had all but disappeared.54 Over half of the counties
in the United States had seen all their S&Ls close and roughly onefifth of the nation was without access to an institution capable of
45

The National Bank Act, 13 Stat. 100 (June 3, 1864) (codified as amended at
12 U.S.C. §§ 21-216d) (2000). The purpose of the National Bank Act was to
“provide a national currency secured by a pledge of United States bonds, and to
provide for the circulation and redemption thereof.” See § 38.
46
Id.
47
Long, supra note 33, at 99.
48
Id. See also BERNANKE, supra note 5, at 45 (2d prtg. 2004) (noting that until
the Great Depression, panics were contained by “loose organizations of urban
banks” that provided stability).
49
BERNANKE, supra note 5, at 45.
50
Federal Reserve Act, 38 Stat. 251 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 221522 (2000).).
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
BERNANKE, supra note 5, at 47-48, 62.
54
See generally BERNANKE, supra note 5, at 41-69.
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providing a mortgage.55 In the wake of the collapse of the state
banking system and the severe contraction of credit to homeowners,
Congress enacted HOLA.56 HOLA created a system of federallybacked and federally-regulated S&Ls to help ensure they would be
“permanent associations to promote the thrift of the people in a
cooperative manner, to finance their homes and the homes of their
neighbors.”57
B. The OTS Regulations
To regulate federally-backed banks, Congress created the OTS
under the Department of the Treasury.58 HOLA gave the OTS “plenary
authority to issue regulations governing federal savings and loans.”59
The language creating the OTS “expresses no limits on [its] authority
to regulate” and even the Supreme Court has noted that “it would have
been difficult for Congress to have given the [OTS] a broader
mandate.”60
From this grant of authority, the OTS developed regulations,
including regulations governing its power to preempt state law.61 The
OTS is “authorized to promulgate regulations that preempt state laws
affecting the operations of federal savings associations when deemed
appropriate to facilitate the safe and sound operation of federal

55

Fid. Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 160 (1982).
Id. In the wake of the financial collapse, many traditional lenders left the
market almost entirely. For example, life insurance companies made $525 million in
home mortgage loans in 1929, but only $16 million in 1934. In 1934, the year after
HOLA was enacted, seventy-one percent of all home mortgage loans were made by
the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (created by HOLA). See BERNANKE, supra
note 5, at 64-65.
57
S.REP. 73RD CONG.-NO. 91, at 2 (1933).
58
de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 162. The original agency was known as the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board. OTS is used for consistency. See supra note 12.
59
de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 160.
60
Id. at 161.
61
The OTS’ authority to regulate is outlined in sections 4(a) and 5(a) of
HOLA. See 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(a) (2007).
56
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[S&Ls].”62 The OTS regulations—which have been upheld by
courts—explicitly give it the power to occupy the “entire field of
lending regulation for federal [S&Ls].”63 With only very narrow
exceptions, “federal savings associations may extend credit as
authorized under federal law, including this part, without regard to
state laws purporting to regulate or otherwise affect their credit
activities.”64
Because of the broad grant of Congressional power in HOLA, the
OTS has, “without limitation,” exempted large swaths of S&L
operations from state regulation.65 These areas include licensing and
registration, credit terms offered to customers, servicing fees,
disbursements, escrow accounts, insurance on mortgages, and
insurance due on sale clauses.66 The narrow exception for state laws
62

See HOLA §§ 4(a), 5(a) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1463(a),
1464(a) (2000)).
63
12 C.F.R. § 560.2(a).
64
Id. According to the OTS regulations, “‘state law’ includes any state statute,
regulation, ruling, order or judicial decision.” Id.
65
12 C.F.R. § 560.2(b) (2007).
66
See 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(b). (“Except as provided by the exemption section of
the regulation, the following types of state laws are preempted without limitation: (1)
Licensing, registration, filings, or reports by creditors; (2)The ability of a creditor to
require or obtain private mortgage insurance, insurance for other collateral, or other
credit enhancements; (3) Loan-to-value ratios; (4) The terms of credit, including
amortization of loans and the deferral and capitalization of interest and adjustments
to the interest rate, balance, payments due, or term to maturity of the loan, including
the circumstances under which a loan may be called due and payable upon the
passage of time or a specified event external to the loan; (5) Loan-related fees,
including without limitation, initial charges, late charges, prepayment penalties,
servicing fees, and overlimit fees; (6) Escrow accounts, impound accounts, and
similar accounts; (7) Security property, including leaseholds; (8) Access to and use
of credit reports; (9) Disclosure and advertising, including laws requiring specific
statements, information, or other content to be included in credit application forms,
credit solicitations, billing statements, credit contracts, or other credit-related
documents and laws requiring creditors to supply copies of credit reports to
borrowers or applicants; (10) Processing, origination, servicing, sale or purchase of,
or investment or participation in, mortgages; (11) Disbursements and repayments;
(12)Usury and interest rate ceilings to the extent provided in 12 U.S.C. 1735f-7a and
part 590 of this chapter and 12 U.S.C. 1463(g) and § 560.110 of this part; and (13)
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arises when a state law “only incidentally affect[s] the lending
operations of Federal [S&Ls] or [is] otherwise consistent with the
purposes of [this regulation].”67 The regulation also provides one
additional area that is not preempted and gives the OTS the ability to
allow state or common law claims to proceed.68 The OTS may declare
a state law not preempted if, upon review, it finds that the law: (i)
Furthers a vital state interest; and (ii) Either has only an incidental
effect on lending operations or is not otherwise contrary to the
purposes expressed in paragraph (a) of [the preemption regulation].”69
In interpreting the statute and the resulting regulations, however, the
courts had to determine the level of deference appropriate to both
HOLA and the OTS regulations.
C. Judicial Deference to the OTS Regulations
All regulatory agencies are not created equal however, and their
regulations are subject to varying degrees of deference—both from the
states and from the courts.70 With the rise of the administrative state
after the New Deal, the tension between conflicting state and federal
laws increased.71 To deal with the conflicts, courts looked to the

Due-on-sale clauses to the extent provided in 12 U.S.C. 1701j-3 and part 591 of this
chapter.”).
67
12 C.F.R. § 560.2(c) (2007).
68
Id.
69
Id. (“State laws of the following types are not preempted to the extent that
they only incidentally affect the lending operations of Federal savings associations or
are otherwise consistent with the purposes of paragraph (a) of this section: (1)
Contract and commercial law; (2) Real property law; (3) Homestead laws specified
in 12 U.S.C. 1462a(f); (4) Tort law; (5) Criminal law; and (6) Any other law that
OTS, upon review, finds: (i) Furthers a vital state interest; and (ii) Either has only an
incidental effect on lending operations or is not otherwise contrary to the purposes
expressed in paragraph (a) of this section.”).
70
For example, the OCC, which regulates national banks, has traditionally had
much less authority to preempt state law than the OTS, which regulates national
S&Ls. See Reardon, supra note 11, at 358.
71
See Reardon, supra note 11, at 356.

285
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2007

11

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 10

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 3, Issue 1

Fall 2007

Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.72 Based on the Supremacy
Clause, courts developed a body of precedent that determined when,
and to what degree, federal regulations would preempt (i.e. supersede)
state laws and regulations.73
1. Preemption Doctrine
To determine whether a state law or regulation is preempted,
courts first look to Congressional intent.74 Depending on
Congressional intent, courts may find either express or implied federal
preemption.75 In express preemption, Congress explicitly states its
intent for the federal law to preempt state law.76 Even without explicit
Congressional language, Courts may still find implied Congressional
intent when the language of the statute requires preemption.77 There
are two types of implied preemption: field preemption and conflict
preemption.78 In field preemption79, the body of federal law is so
encompassing that it makes clear Congress implicitly meant to
72

Id.; see U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof, and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”).
73
Reardon, supra note 11, at 356.
74
Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280 (1987).
75
Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (providing
an overview of preemption doctrine).
76
Berg, supra note 21, at 500. See also Bank of Am. v. City and County of San
Francisco, 309 F.3d 551, 558 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Guerra, 479 U.S. at 280).
77
Gade, 505 U.S. at 98.
78
Berg, supra note 21, at 500.
79
An example of this type of preemption would be immigration; federal law,
and not state law, is responsible for determining whether an immigrant my legally
enter the country, become a naturalized citizen, or be deported. Monica Guizar,
Facts About Federal Preemption: How to analyze whether state and local initiatives
are an unlawful attempt to enforce federal immigration law or regulate immigration
(Nat’l Immigration Law Center, Los Angeles, Cal.), June 2007, at 4, available at
http://www.nilc.org/immlawpolicy/LocalLaw/federalpreemptionfacts_2007-0628.pdf.
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preempt state regulation.80 Conflict preemption occurs when the state
and federal schemes are irreconcilable.81
Determining the scope of preemption—often even express
preemption—requires a detailed analysis to determine what, exactly,
Congress meant to preempt.82 The problem arises because statutory
language is open to interpretation by the courts.83 Courts do not
generally presume preemption, especially when the federal law or
regulations would preempt the traditional police powers of the states.84
If, however, there is a significant history of federal regulation in a
particular area, the presumption against preemption does not apply.85
Traditionally, courts have held that the OTS’ regulation of federal
S&Ls are so pervasive that they trigger field preemption.86 In fact,
some courts have created a reverse presumption in dealing with OTS
regulations—that state law is always preempted in the face of OTS
regulation.87
80

Bank of Am., 309 F.3d at 558 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).). This type of field preemption occurs in
two situations: (1) the federal law and regulations are so pervasive that they leave no
room for state supplementation or (2) the federal law and regulations are so
dominant they preclude additional laws. Reardon, supra note 11, at 357.
81
Gade, 505 U.S. at 98. See also Berg, supra note 21, at 500. Conflict
preemption occurs when: (1) it is physically impossible to comply with both the
federal and state schemes; (2) the state law or regulation thwarts the intent of
Congress; or (3) state law preempts the implementation of the federal law or
regulation. Reardon, supra note 11, at 358-59.
82
Reardon, supra note 11, at 356-57.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 358-59.
85
United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000).
86
Reardon, supra note 11, at 357 n. 80. The Note catalogues several of the
important historical Supreme Court cases where the Court has simply deferred to the
OTS regulations. This presumption is important because it often shifts the burden of
proof. The OTS’ regulations are presumed to preempt state law. Thus, the party
challenging the regulation has the burden to show that the state law is not preempted,
rather than the OTS having the burden to show that it is.
87
Id. at 363-64. The article discusses the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Bank of
Am. v. City and County of San Francisco, 309 F.3d 551 (9th Cir. 2002). The opinion
concerned banking and S&L regulation (administered by the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) and the OTS, respectively). The court noted
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2. Applying Preemption Doctrine to the OTS Regulations
The OTS regulations clearly evince a belief by the agency that
Congress granted it the authority to preempt virtually all state
regulation.88 But a regulatory agency’s determination of its power is
valid only if the courts uphold both the grant of power and the
agency’s exercise of it.89 If the courts decide that the Congressional
grant is unconstitutional, they can limit the ability of the agency to
make regulations.90 Even if the court holds the grant to be valid,
however, they can hold that the regulation is outside the scope of the
grant of power.91
By the time HOLA was passed in 1933, Congress had already
evinced a willingness to at least dabble in the banking industry for
nearly one hundred fifty years. McCulloch v. Maryland first
established the Constitutional basis for the federal government to
create and regulate a federal banking system.92 Since the National
Bank Act of 1864 and the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, the Court has
recognized that interpreting Congressional banking regulations was an
that federal banking was a traditionally preempted area and stated that it would give
deference to the agencies’ regulations as long as they were reasonable. Interestingly,
however, the court did not analyze the reasonableness of the regulations, but simply
stated the regulations were reasonable. Id.
88
See generally 12 C.F.R. § 560.2 (2007).
89
See generally Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S.
837 (1984).
90
Id. (discussing the standard for deference to administrative regulations and
decisions).
91
Id. Chevron established a two step test to determine how much deference a
court should give to an administrative agency’s regulations. First, the court must
decide whether Congress explicitly delegated the authority to the agency, and, if so,
the reviewing court must defer to the agency’s decision unless the delegation of
authority was clearly unconstitutional. If Congressional delegation in the statute is
ambiguous, the court will defer to the agency if the agency’s interpretation is
reasonable and the regulation is not clearly arbitrary or capricious. Id. at 842-43.
92
17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819) (holding Congress had the implied power to
create a national banking system and that a state may not impede the exercise of that
constitutionally granted power).
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exercise in “interpreting grants of both enumerated and incidental
‘powers’ to national banks as grants of authority not normally limited
by, but rather ordinarily pre-empting, contrary state law.”93
By the end of the 20th century, both the various circuit courts and
the Supreme Court supported the idea that federal regulation of federal
banks is so “pervasive as to leave no room for state regulatory
control.”94 The courts have also held that the OTS’ regulatory power—
while leaving the states some room over traditional common law areas
and incidental regulations—effectively preempted the field.95 The
regulations receive a presumption of field preemption because “there
has been a ‘history of significant federal presence’ in national banking
[and] the presumption against preemption of state law is
inapplicable.”96 Thus, judicial deference and the history of federal
regulation grant the OTS wide latitude in preempting state law
affecting S&Ls.97
The OTS had promulgated its own interpretation of how its
preemption regulations should be interpreted.98 The OTS guidelines
use a two step analysis to determine whether a state statutory or
common law action is preempted.99 Under this analysis, the court must
first ask whether the state law attempts to regulate any area explicitly
preempted by 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(b)—even if the regulation would be
indirect.100 If the answer is yes, then the state law claim is
automatically preempted by HOLA and 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(c) cannot
93

Barnett Bank of Fla. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 32 (1996) (tracing the history of
preemption from McCulloch to the present day).
94
Conference of Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’ns v. Stein, 604 F.2d 1256, 1260 (9th
Cir. 1979), aff’d, 445 U.S. 921 (1980).
95
Bank of Am. v. City and County of San Francisco, 309 F.3d 551, 558-59 (9th
Cir. 2002).
96
Bank of Am., 309 F.3d at 558-59 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v.
Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000); Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 33 (1996); Franklin Nat’l
Bank v. New York, 347 U.S. 373, 375-76 (1954)).
97
Bank of Am., 309 F.3d at 558-59 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Locke, 529 U.S. 89,
108 (2000); Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 33 (1996); Franklin Nat’l Bank, 347 U.S. at
375-76 (1954)).
98
61 Fed. Reg. 50,951, 50, 966-67 (Sept. 30, 1996).
99
Id.
100
Id.
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“save” the action.101 Only if the answer is no may the court determine
whether the law is not preempted by § 560.2(c) because it would only
have an incidental affect on S&L operations.
Finally, the OTS has taken the Supreme Court’s invitation to “not
feel bound by existing state law.”102 For example, federal and state
banks were generally not allowed to expand beyond state lines until
1994, when Congress expressly permitted interstate bank acquisitions
regardless of state law.103 Under OTS regulations, however, federal
S&Ls were allowed to take over failing S&Ls in other states without
regard to state law, and by 1992, the OTS had abolished all geographic
limitations on S&L expansion.104 The OTS has continued to
aggressively assert its regulatory preemption powers, especially in the
areas of establishing branch offices, lending activities, and deposittaking activities.105 Recently, in 2003, the OTS issued opinions
exempting federal S&Ls from state predatory lending laws in Georgia,
New York, New Jersey, and New Mexico.106
Because the Supreme Court expressly left open the question of
whether all state regulation of federal S&Ls was preempted by HOLA,
lower courts have been forced to determine the level of preemption.107
For many courts, including the Seventh Circuit, the question has been
answered with almost complete deference to the OTS regulations.108
Only in a minority of courts and jurisdictions have any state
regulations been allowed, even when there are only incidental effects
101

Id.
Fid. Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 162 (1982).
103
Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act, Pub. L. No.
103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (1994) (codifed as amended at 12 U.S.C. §1 (2000)).
104
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The OCC’s Preemption Rules Exceed the Agency’s
Authority and Present a Serious Threat to the Dual Banking System and Consumer
Protection, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 225, 282-83 (2004).
105
Id. at 285-86.
106
Id. at 286.
107
de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 159; see also Wilmarth, supra note 104, at 285.
108
See, e.g., Haehl v. Washington Mut. Bank, F.A., 277 F. Supp. 2d 933, 942
(S.D. Ind. 2003), Wis. League of Fin. Inst., Ltd. v. Galecki, 707 F. Supp. 401, 404
(D. Wis. 1989), Moskowitz v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 768 N.E.2d 262, 264-66 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2002); Bank of Am. v. City and County of San Francisco, 309 F.3d 551, 558-60
(9th Cir. 2002).
102
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to the banking system.109 Generally, courts, including both the Illinois
state courts and the Seventh Circuit, have been content to preempt all
state regulation of federal S&Ls. As justification, these courts cite the
long history of significant federal regulation, judicial deference, and
the OTS’ interpretation of its preemption power.
PART II: IN RE OCWEN
In re Ocwen resulted from the consolidation of a number of
complaints brought against Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (“Ocwen”)110
into a multi-district litigation (“MDL”) class action.111 By 2006, fiftyone plaintiffs had joined the litigation and the Consolidated Complaint
listed twenty-three different counts.112 In addition to federal claims
under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act113 and the Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act,114 the plaintiffs alleged violations of
various state consumer protection statutes and common law counts for,
among other things, fraud, unjust enrichment, and breach of
contract.115

109

See, e.g., Gibson v. World Sav. & Loan, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 19, 27-31 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2002); Wells v. Chevy Chase Bank, 832 A.2d 812, 824-33 (Md. 2003).
110
Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC was, at the time relevant for the litigation, a
federally chartered S&L. Although Ocwen did not actually originate home
mortgages, it bought mortgages from other lenders and then administered collecting
payments, premiums, and, if necessary, instituted forclosure proceedings. In re
Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC Mortgage Servicing Litig., 491 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir.
2007).
111
Transfer Order from the MDL Panel Establishing MDL 1604, In re Ocwen
Loan Servicing, LLC Mortgage Servicing Litig., No. 04-C-02714 (Apr. 16, 2004).
112
In re Ocwen Fed. Bank FSB Mortgage Servicing Litig., No. MDL 1604, 04C-2714, 2006 WL 794739, at *1 (March 22, 2006).
113
15 U.S.C. §§ 1692a – 1692p. (2000).
114
12 U.S.C. §§ 2601 – 17 (2000).
115
See generally Consolidated Class Action Complaint, In re Ocwen I, No.
MDL 1604, 04-C-2714, 2004 WL 3688469 (Aug. 23, 2004). The claims
encompassed state laws in California, Connecticut, Illinois, New Mexico, and
Pennsylvania. In re Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC Mortgage Servicing Litig., 491
F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2007).
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The plaintiffs alleged that Ocwen breached their loan agreements
by “ignoring grace periods, misapplying and failing to apply loan
payments, improperly charging late fees, and force-placing insurance
on properties already insured.”116 According to the plaintiffs, this often
caused the plaintiffs to be unable to meet their payments, and resulted
in Ocwen foreclosing on their mortgages.117 In their complaint, the
plaintiffs sought statutory, compensatory, and punitive damages,
restitution and an injunction against Ocwen from engaging in similar
misconduct.118
A. Procedural History
On April 25, 2005, the district court for the Northern District of
Illinois granted Ocwen’s motion for a partial summary judgment,
dismissing a single contract claim, but specifically reserving judgment
on the rest of the plaintiffs’ state and federal law claims.119
In July 2005, Ocwen filed a motion to enjoin what was, in effect,
parallel litigation in the Texas state courts by three Texas law firms
that also represented members of the plaintiffs’ class.120 The district
court enjoined the Texas proceeding, but was reversed on appeal.121 In
reversing the district court, the Seventh Circuit held that “[a]lthough
an injunction prohibiting discovery could be appropriate in some
circumstances, the broad injunction prohibiting all litigation [in the
state of Texas] by the Texas law firms is not supported by the record in
this case.”122
116

In re Ocwen I, No. MDL 1604, 04-C-2714, 2006 WL 794739, at *1 (N.D.
Ill. Mar. 22, 2006).
117
Consolidated Class Action Complaint, In re Ocwen I, No. MDL 1604, 04-C2714, 2004 WL 3688469 (Aug. 23, 2004).
118
Id.
119
In re Ocwen I, No. MDL 1604, 04-C-2714, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 25, 2005).
120
Prelim. Inj. Motion, In re Ocwen I, No. MDL 1604, 04-C-2714 (N.D. Ill.
July 29, 2005).
121
Id., see Brief For Appellants, In re Ocwen I, No. MDL 1604, 04-C-2714,
2006 WL 794739, at *8-12 (N.D. Il. Mar. 22, 2006); In re Ocwen I, No. 05-4268,
slip op. at 4 (7th Cir. Dec. 13, 2005).
122
In re Ocwen I, No. 05-4268, slip op. at 4 (7th Cir. Dec. 13, 2005).

292
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol3/iss1/10

18

Attaway: Cracking the Door to State Recovery from Federal Thrifts

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 3, Issue 1

Fall 2007

During this time, both parties continued to file motions.123 Ocwen
filed motions to dismiss the complaint based on preemption of state
law claims, failure to state a claim, and for lack of personal
jurisdiction.124 The plaintiffs continued to add new named plaintiffs
and filed numerous motions to remand various issues to state courts.125
In January of 2006, the parties and the district court agreed on an
order for determining the numerous outstanding motions.126 All parties
and the court agreed that most, if not all, of the state causes of action
would be dismissed if the court found them preempted by the OTS
regulations.127 Thus, the agreement stipulated that Ocwen’s motion for
dismissal of the state law claims would be the first motion decided.128
The district court ordered additional briefing in light of the Seventh
Circuit’s order vacating the injunction against the Texas law firms and
ruled on March 22, 2006.129
In its ruling, the district court noted that “[s]tate regulation of
banking is permissible when it ‘does not prevent or significantly
interfere with the national bank’s exercise of its powers’.”130 The
district court used this concept and the exceptions to federal
preemption listed in 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(c) to allow the state law claims
to proceed.131 According to exception six under § 560.2(c), a state law
123

See Docket, In re Ocwen I, No. MDL 1604, 04-C-2714 (N.D. Ill.).
Id.
125
Id.
126
In re Ocwen I, No. MDL 1604, 04-C-2714, 2006 WL 794739, at *2 (N.D.
Ill. Mar. 22, 2006).
127
Id.
128
Id. The district court ordered additional briefing on the issue because it felt
that they related to whether to joined state law claims in the consolidated litigation
could go forward.
129
See generally id.
130
Id. at *4, (citing Bank of Am. v. City and County of San Francisco, 309
F.3d 551, 558-59 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Barnett Bank of Fla. v. Nelson, 517 U.S.
25, 33 (1996))).
131
Id. at *4-5 (March 22, 2006). “State laws governing federal S&Ls are
accepted for the following categories when they only ‘incidentally affect’ lending
operations: (1) Contract and commercial law; (2) Real property law; (3) Homestead
laws specified in 12 U.S.C. 1462a(f); (4) Tort law; (5) Criminal law; and (6) Any
other law that OTS, upon review, finds: (i) Furthers a vital state interest; and (ii)
124
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may regulate a federal S&L when there is a vital state interest and it
would further the aims of HOLA.132 The court reasoned that consumer
protection was a vital state interest, satisfying the first part of the
test.133 The district court then reasoned that Congress intended for
HOLA to protect consumers, and that allowing the state law claims to
proceed would further Congressional intent.134 The court allowed
Ocwen to file an interlocutory appeal to decide “whether . . . HOLA
and its implementing regulations . . . preempt plaintiffs’ state-law
claims challenging the mortgage-servicing activities of, and loanrelated fees allegedly assessed by, a federal [S&L].”135
B. The Seventh Circuit’s Opinion
A Seventh Circuit panel consisting of Judges Posner, Rovner, and
Sykes heard the appeal on March 28, 2007 and Judge Posner issued
the opinion of the panel on June 22, 2007.136 Judge Posner, writing for
the court, noted that HOLA does not create private rights of action and
gives the OTS only limited remedial authority to enforce its
regulations.137 In doing so, Judge Posner adopted the reasoning of the
district court, and placed consumer protection above a general
Either has only an incidental effect on lending operations or is not otherwise contrary
to the purposes expressed in paragraph (a) of this section.” 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(c)
(2007).
132
12 C.F.R. § 560.2(c)(6). This is the language that the district court seizes on
to deny Ocwen’s motion to dismiss. It is interesting to note, however, that the actual
wording of the regulation gives the OTS, not the courts, the final authority to
determine whether or not a particular state law meets the criteria. (“Any other law
that OTS, upon review, finds . . .”). Id.
133
In re Ocwen I, at *4 (N.D. Ill. March 22, 2006).
134
Id. The court also took notice of the Seventh Circuit’s decision to allow the
state law claims in Texas to proceed. According to the court’s reasoning, had the
Seventh Circuit felt the state law claims had been preempted, it would not have
allowed the Texas state law actions to proceed. Id.
135
Appellants’ Opening Brief, In re Ocwen I, No. MDL 1604, 04-C-2714, 2006
WL 2788080 (Sept. 13, 2006).
136
See In re Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC Mortgage Servicing Litig., 491 F.3d
638, 643 (7th Cir. 2007).
137
Id.
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preemption of the field.138 The court affirmed the district court’s
refusal to dismiss the complaint, but also provided an analysis of the
state law claims—giving insight into which claims it thought were
preempted and which it did not.139
1. The Court’s Analysis
It is useful to view the court’s opinion as having three parts: in the
first, the court discusses the background facts and provides an
overview of the law; in the second, the court formulates its own rule;
and in the third, the court applies its rule to each of the claims.140
Judge Posner first noted that the complaint “is a hideous sprawling
mess” and that “the defendants [could] hardly be blamed for wanting
to strangle the monster in its crib” with the motion to preempt most of
the litigation.141 The court noted that “of course” Ocwen was correct
that the OTS guidelines should be used to interpret the regulations, and
even referred to the line between preempted and non-preempted
actions as “both intuitive and reasonably clear.”142 Here, however, is
where the party ends for Ocwen.
The court stated that HOLA gave the OTS broad plenary power to
issue regulations for federal S&Ls, and gave it some power to enforce
its regulations, but it did not give the OTS power to adjudicate
disputes between the S&Ls and their customers.143 The OTS could not
provide a remedy to customers who were harmed by S&Ls who
violated OTS regulations.144 The court also noted that consumer
138

Id. (“It would be surprising for a federal regulation to forbid the
homeowner’s state to give the homeowner a defense based on . . . breach of
contract.”); compare In re Ocwen I, No. MDL 1604, 04-C-2714, 2006 WL 794739,
at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 2006) (“[C]ourts should be cautious in finding preemption
in areas of consumer protection.”).
139
In re Ocwen II, 491 F.3d at 644-50.
140
See generally id.
141
Id. at 643.
142
Id.
143
Id. (citing OTS, “How to Resolve a Consumer Complaint 1-2,”
www.ots.treas.gov/docs/4/480924.pdf. (last visited June 5, 2007)).
144
Id.
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protection was part of the reason the OTS was created and given the
power to regulate in the first place.145
By emphasizing the purpose of HOLA, the court restricted the
language of preempted areas to the actual language of the statute.146
This restriction effectively expanded the definition of what it means to
“incidentally affect” lending operations.147 The court recognized that
certain common law remedies were enforceable—these remedies may
affect S&L operations, but they do so no more than they would affect
any business.148 For the court, requiring that S&Ls meet minimum
standards of ethical business practice was only an incidental effect on
an S&L’s operations, even if it forced the S&L to do something not
required—or even allowed—by the OTS regulations.
Interestingly, the first part of the opinion is scant on the law of
preemption. The court only mentioned preemption in reference to
HOLA, the OTS preemption regulation, and the OTS guidelines for
interpreting the OTS’ exemption power.149 The court did not discuss
how other courts, or even past Seventh Circuit panels, have interpreted
the preemption authority Congress gave the OTS under HOLA or even
how preemption of state law normally arises.150 On reading the first
part of the court’s discussion it appears that the court will hold the
OTS’ preemption regulation reasonable without discussion and
summarily dismiss the state law claims.
This approach would not be without precedent. The Ninth Circuit,
in Bank of America v. City and County of San Francisco, noted that
regulations must be reasonable, but accepted—without discussion—
that the OCC and OTS regulations were reasonable.151 Here, the court
seems to accept—without discussion—that the OTS regulations
preempt the field. Similarly, it appears here that the Seventh Circuit
145

Id.
Id.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
See generally Id.
151
See generally Bank of Am. v. City and County of San Francisco, 309 F.3d
551 (9th Cir. 2002).
146
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accepts as obvious that any state law or regulation that attempts to
directly regulate the expressly preempted areas is preempted.152 It also
states that “[i]t would not do to let the broad standards characteristic of
[contracts, commercial law, and torts] morph into a scheme of state
regulation.”153 Reading the outline of the law the court provided
makes it initially appear that the court will side with precedent and the
Ninth Circuit, and adopt an extremely deferential attitude to the OTS
regulations.154 Yet precisely the opposite happens—after
acknowledging the regulations and interpretations, the court proceeds
to ignore them.155
According to the court, subsection (c) of the OTS preemption
regulation was not meant to “deprive persons harmed by the wrongful
acts of savings and loan associations of their basic state common-lawtype remedies.”156 Judge Posner reasoned that Congress has the power
to preempt any remedy other than those it prescribes, or to even bar
recovery completely, but it does not do so often.157 When Congress
bars recovery to an injured plaintiff, it is the exception, not the rule.158
For the court, barring recovery is similar to federal preemption—in
order for it to exist, Congress must clearly state its intent that the bar
should exist and the reasons for the bar.159
For the court, the OTS meant for state law to complement federal
regulations and subsection (c) of the preemption regulation does so by
upholding the basic laws and “norms that undergird commercial
transactions.”160 The court reasoned that the norms will only
incidentally affect federal S&L operations because the state’s
objective—consumer protection—is not in conflict with the OTS’
objective of providing for the safe and sound operation of federal
152

In re Ocwen II, 491 F.3d at 643.
Id.
154
Id.
155
Id. at 643-44.
156
Id. at 643 (interpreting 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(c) (2007).).
157
In re Ocwen II, 491 F.3d at 644.
158
Id.
159
Id. (noting that ERISA is an example of a federal law that does bar common
law suits).
160
Id.
153
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S&Ls.161 Thus, the court held that despite precedent to the contrary,
the general state commercial laws are not preempted precisely because
they serve the same purpose as the federal regulations.162
This interpretation tends to disregard the OTS guidelines for
preemption that, just a few paragraphs before, the court had accepted
as obvious. Additionally, the court—like the district court before it—
failed to follow the strict letter of the OTS’ preemption exemption
subsection. Both the Seventh Circuit and the district court based their
opinion on a state’s compelling interest in protecting its resident
consumers.163 Both courts coupled this compelling consumer
protection interest with the idea that state consumer protection laws
are complementary to the purpose of HOLA and the OTS in general.164
And both ignored the part of the regulation that states that only the
OTS can decide whether a law serves a compelling state interest and is
complementary to the OTS regulations such that it should not be
exempted.165 The court appears to give great deference to the
regulations, but bases its fundamental argument on a power the OTS
clearly meant to keep out of judicial hands.
The court takes the same approach justifying its interpretation
with OTS board decisions. It chooses only those decisions that suit its
needs. For example, the court cites to an OTS opinion that states that
“[s]tate laws prohibiting deceptive acts and practices in the course of
commerce are not included in the illustrative list of preempted laws in
section 560.2(b).”166 The court ignores, however, the OTS opinions
from 2003 that expressly preempted federal S&Ls from state predatory
lending laws in Georgia, New York, New Jersey, and New Mexico.167
161

Id.
Id. at 644-45.
163
See id.; compare In re Ocwen I, No. MDL 1604, 04-C-2714, 2006 WL
794739, at *4-5 (March 22, 2006).
164
In re Ocwen II, 491 F.3d 638; compare In re Ocwen I, No. MDL 1604, 04C-2714, 2006 WL 794739, at *4-5 (March 22, 2006).
165
12 C.F.R. § 560.2(c) (2007).
166
In re Ocwen II, 491 F.3d at 644 (quoting Preemption of State Law
Applicable to Credit Card Transactions ¶IIC (Opinion of OTS Chief Counsel, Dec
24, 1996, 1996 WL 767462).
167
Wilmarth, supra note 104, at 286.
162
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The court gives lip service to judicial deference without actually
deferring to the OTS.
In coming to this decision Judge Posner and the court had to at
least partially break with the long line of cases where the courts
refused to enforce any state law or remedy that might possibly affect
some aspect of a federal S&L’s operations.168 By determining that
common law actions that complement the intent of the federal
regulations are acceptable, the court implicitly broadened the
definition of what is incidental.169 And the court does so while giving
the appearance of deference.170 The standard the court seeks to enforce
is a far cry from accepting the OTS regulations as so “pervasive as to
leave no room for state regulatory control.”171 “[N]o room for state
regulatory control” is a clear statement for the states, and the courts, to
practice extreme deference when interpreting the regulations and to
almost always err on the side of finding preemption.172
By holding that general business law173 can apply to federal
S&Ls, Judge Posner and the court broaden incidental effects to cover
consumer protection.174 This allows plaintiffs to recover when they
may otherwise be barred by either prior precedent or the OTS
regulations and guidelines.175 Rather than applying the idea of a
pervasive field preemption, the court seems instead to rely on a
conflicts analysis of preemption—only those laws that would directly
interfere with the federal regulations are preempted, anything else will

168

See supra Part I.
In re Ocwen II, 491 F.3d at 643-44.
170
Id. at 643 (In the opening of the opinion, Judge Posner noted that “of
course” the OTS regulations were controlling and that the OTS guidelines should be
used to interpret the regulations.).
171
Conference of Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’ns v. Stein, 604 F.2d 1256, 1260 (9th
Cir. 1979), aff’d, 445 U.S. 921, 100 (1980).
172
Id.
173
The court talks about general business laws as “state laws prohibiting
deceptive acts and practices in the course of commerce.” In re Ocwen II, 491 F.3d at
644.
174
See id. at 643-45
175
See id.
169
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be saved.176 Taken in this light, it becomes clear why the court chose
not to set forth the varying standards of preemption. If the court had
more clearly articulated the standard, it would have largely constrained
itself to applying broad field preemption.177 By explicitly accepting the
OTS regulations as binding, however, the court allows itself greater
discretion to interpret the regulation as it sees fit.
This approach allowed the court to interpret the regulation for
itself—rather than locking it into deference to the OTS. In doing so,
the court seems to implicitly accept that even though business
standards may differ dramatically from state to state, applying them to
federal S&Ls is an acceptable intrusion into the federal regulatory
scheme, even though it may force an S&L to conform to a myriad of
rules for different jurisdictions. The court’s coup d’etat, then, is not so
much which of the state causes of action are not preempted, but rather
that the court’s new rule allows the courts—and not the OTS—to
decide when state law would apply.
2. Applying a New Standard
The court then used its newfound authority and rule to state, in
dicta, “which claims fall on the regulatory side of the ledger and which
. . . fall on the common law side.”178 The court took each state law
claim in turn, and determined whether it was: (a) clearly preempted,
(b) clearly not preempted, or (c) possibly preempted but more
information was needed to decide. This Note does not attempt a claim
by claim analysis—a process that the court undertook and that it called

176

See supra Part I. (discussing the different methods, relative strength, and
presumptions of the various ways of finding preemption).
177
The majority of circuit courts have accepted the OTS guidelines as
controlling. See generally Wilmarth, supra note 104; Reardon, supra note 11, at 36364. Had the Seventh Circuit more clearly articulated precedent, it is likely that it
would have been forced to follow the OTS guidelines. See, e.g. Bank of Am. v. City
and County of San Francisco, 309 F.3d 551 (9th Cir. 2002). The guidelines forbid
reaching any exceptions to preemption if there is any effect on a preempted area
listed in subsection (b). See In re Ocwen II, 491 F.3d at 643.
178
In re Ocwen II, 491 F.3d at 644.
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a “tedious recital.”179 Reviewing the court’s analysis, a pattern
emerges.180
From the court’s discussion of which causes of action are
preempted and which are not, it is clear that the court intends that only
those actions which would squarely fall into the regulation of a
prohibited area should be preempted and bar recovery. The court
seems willing to allow more regulatory control by the states in an
effort to do what it feels the federal regulations have failed to do—
protect consumers.
First, the court held that only one of the seventeen state law
claims was clearly fully preempted.181 Claim thirteen charged fraud
and a “gross disparity between the value received by the class and the
price paid”182 under the New Mexico Unfair Practices Act.183
The court also stated that many of the claims were allowable
because they alleged common law actions. For the court, the key to
preemption was whether or not the claim had to be classified as a state
law (which would be preempted), or whether it could be a common
law action (which would generally not be preempted.)
These claims included additional breach of contract claims (claim
five), violations of good faith and fair dealing (claim six), fraud
(claims three, seven, and twenty), and slander/defamation (claims
seventeen, twenty-one);184 the slander and defamation claims are of
particular interest. Both allege that Ocwen committed a wrongful act
by either: (1) instituting an lis pendens action against the plaintiffs
without a valid basis, or (2) representing to third persons that the
plaintiffs were in default.185 Recovery of some value of a bank’s assets
through foreclosure seems to be intimately bound to the regular

179

Id. at 648.
Id. at 644-48.
181
See id.
182
Id. at 647.
183
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-1 (West 2007).
184
See id. at 644-48.
185
Id. at 648.
180
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operation of any bank or S&L.186 Here, however, the court holds up
both actions as “good example[s] of claim[s] that the regulation does
not preempt.”187
The court could not classify nine of the claims. Of those, four
included fraud or negligence allegations.188 Although these claims
were brought under various state and common laws, they suffered
from the same fatal flaw—a failure to provide enough information for
the court to understand what was being alleged.189 Three of the claims
alleged fraud among other clearly preempted actions.190 The court
stated that the three claims were impossible to classify because they
did not provide enough information, were not pled with
particularity,191 and were impossible to understand.192 Similarly, the
court stated that another claim was a bare assertion of common law
negligence that could not stand without more information.193 The court
also stated that it was unclear whether five additional claims would be
preempted because it was unclear whether the plaintiffs allegations
covered preempted areas or not.194
It is the five unclear claims that provide the greatest insight into
the court’s path forward, however. For several of the claims, the court
gave the plaintiffs a roadmap to avoid preemption—at least as far as
the Seventh Circuit is concerned. For example, one of the claims
largely dealt with the fees charged by banks and deceptive advertising
186

As with any business, banks and S&Ls try to minimize their losses on bad
investments. For banks, this means minimizing losses on bad loans through
foreclosure and resale.
187
In re Ocwen II, 491 F.3d at 648.
188
Id. at 647-48.
189
Id.
190
The fifteenth claim alleged fraud under the Pennsylvania Uniform Trade
Practices and Consumer Protection Law. Id. at 647. The sixteenth claim, brought
under the Pennsylvania Fair Credit Extension Uniformity Act, basically alleged
“deceptive practices in collection,” but also included numerous references to fraud.
Id. at 647-48. The twenty-second claim alleged common law fraud. Id. at 648.
191
See FED R. CIV. P. 9(b) (requiring that fraud be pled with particularity).
192
Id. at 647.
193
Id. at 648;
194
See id. at 644-48.
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practices.195 The court held most of the claims preempted, but
provided two exceptions.196 In the first exception, the court noted
claims of excess fees are generally preempted under the OTS
regulations, but would not be preempted if the claim was based on the
terms of the loan contract.197 Similarly, the court stated that claims of
deceptive advertising are preempted if they are based in state laws that
require truthful marketing, but are not preempted if they are based on
common law fraud.198 In both cases, the court shows the plaintiffs how
to make the claims allowable.
The courts determination on when foreclosure fees are due also
shows that the court is, to some degree, failing to faithfully defer to the
OTS regulations and guidelines. Under Ocwen’s mortgage
agreements, the plaintiffs must pay all of the fees to foreclose on their
house at the beginning of a foreclosure.199 The claim alleges that this
arrangement violated Illinois state law.200 The court stated that the
claim would not be preempted as long as it is based in a breach of
contract action.201 Here the court clearly expands the definition of
“incidentally affects.”
Inherent in the court’s reasoning is a radical concept—an area that
would be traditionally preempted under the OTS regulations (when a
plaintiff must pay foreclosure fees) is not preempted if it is based on a
common law action.202 Fees are an area clearly preempted by §
560.2(b), but, as long as the issue is contractual and not regulatory, it
only incidentally affects Ocwen’s operations.203 This holding clearly
furthers the court’s purpose of allowing plaintiffs to recover under the
common law, even though the claims, pled differently, would be
preempted. It is an example of just how powerful the Seventh Circuit’s
new rule can be.
195

Id.
Id.
197
Id.
198
Id.
199
Id.
200
Id. at 647.
201
Id.
202
Id. See also 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(b) (2007).
203
In re Ocwen II, 491 F.3d at 647.
196
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In dicta, the court makes clear that its earlier decision to allow the
alternative Texas litigation to proceed was not a fluke and that it did
not fail to address the preemption issue.204 In In re Ocwen, the Seventh
Circuit made a policy judgment. From the opinion, it appears the court
believes that some state law claims should go forward, even in areas
that would traditionally trigger federal preemption. The careful
crafting of the opinion and roadmap to avoid preemption make it clear
the court feels that states should—at least to some degree—be
involved in the regulation of federal S&Ls that operate within their
territory.
To reach this outcome, however, the court must make an end-run
around the pervasive OTS regulations and the OTS guidelines for
interpreting preemption. The court attempts to strike a balance
between protecting consumers through state law and ensuring that the
common law actions do not preempt the federal regulations. The court
first recognizes that the OTS has preemptive power, but then interprets
the OTS regulations and guidelines in a way that gives ultimate
control of what is preempted and what is not to the courts—not the
OTS.
PART III: TOO HOT, TOO COLD, OR JUST RIGHT?
The question then becomes, how much state regulation is too
much? Generally, courts have barely cracked the door to state
regulation.205 Opening the door to even slightly more of state
regulation of federal banks runs the risk of undermining the OTS’
authority to preempt state law.206 Undermining that authority could
potentially undercut the power of the OTS to enforce its regulations.
However, Judge Posner correctly pointed out that barring any state
cause of action in blind deference to the OTS seriously undercuts the
204

Id. at 644-48.
See, e.g., Gibson v. World Sav. & Loan, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 19, 27-31 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2002); Wells v. Chevy Chase Bank, 832 A.2d 812, 824-33 (Md. 2003).
206
12 C.F.R. § 560.2(a) (2007). Note as well that the OTS has aggressively
campaigned to expand its exemption power since the 1970’s, and has been largely
successful in its expansion. See generally Wilmarth, supra note 104.
205
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ability of consumers to recover because of a federal S&L’s bad or
negligent acts.207 There is also the additional worry that too much of a
good thing is a bad thing. An extremely deferential court that never
challenges the OTS’ regulations runs the risk of concentrating
unchecked power in the hands of the agency—which means that there
is nothing to stop it from serving interests other than those in its
mandate.208
It is perhaps easiest to start with where the two sides agree. No
one doubts that regulation on banks is necessary; banks are “an
unusual mix of hazardous might and fragility.”209 Leading economists,
including Ben Bernake, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, blame
much of the length and severity of the Great Depression on the
collapse of the banking system.210 Even today, banks’ balance sheets
are composed of liquid debt (deposits that can be called immediately)
and illiquid assets (mortgages and other loans).211
Without a safety net, a failure of investor confidence creates
financial panics where people seek to withdraw money from the
system.212 This forces banks into a liquidity crisis where they must
liquidate their illiquid assets, often below market value.213 It also
forces them to keep more money in reserve because of higher risk,
thus lowering capital available for lending.214 Although the Federal
Reserve and the federal regulatory agencies have helped to stabilize
the system since the Great Depression, the system is still vulnerable to
207

In re Ocwen, 491 F.3d at 642-43.
Several commentators already feel the OTS and the OCC have exceeded
their Congressional mandates and are in the midst of a power grab from the states.
See, e.g. Keith R. Fisher, Toward a Basal Tenth Amendment: A Riposte to National
Bank Preemption of State Consumer Protection Laws, 29 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y
981 (Summer 2006); Reardon, supra note 11, at 363-64; Donald C. Lampe, Federal
Preemption and the Future of Mortgage Loan Regulation, 59 BUS. LAW. 1297 (May
2004); Berg, supra note 21, at 502.
209
Economics Focus: When to Bail Out, ECONOMIST, Oct. 6, 2007, at 90.
210
See generally BENJAMIN BERNANKE, ESSAYS ON THE GREAT DEPRESSION
(2d prtg. 2004).
211
Economics Focus: When to Bail Out, supra note 209, at 90.
212
BERNANKE, supra note 5, at 44-45.
213
Id.
214
Id.
208
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shocks—largely from new financial instruments that are largely
unregulated.215 Today, those instruments, worth nearly $1 trillion, are
losing hundreds of billions of dollars per month in value, and are
increasingly forcing banks to horde money—similar to banking
behavior during the Great Depression.216
It is also important to remember that banks and S&Ls are
businesses—driven by their shareholders to create new capital.
Without regulation, banks—the pillars of capitalism—would act like
any other business and seek to maximize profit by minimizing daily
operating costs. In other words, banks have an incentive to reduce
deposits held in reserve to only the amount necessary to meet daily
operating costs and lend the remainder to generate more profit. While
this may be fine for normal operations, in the event of a run on the
bank, the bank would not be able to meet its obligations and could
collapse.217 Part of the original mandate in HOLA is to ensure the
“safe and sound operation, and regulation of savings associations.”218
This can only be done when regulations require banks to hold enough
cash in reserve to meet at least mild “rainy day” obligations.
Of course, agreeing that there needs to be regulation is not
agreeing to how much regulation is proper. On the one hand are those,
including the OTS, who favor only allowing federal regulation. They
argue that if the regulation is “too hot” (i.e. states get in the business of
requiring additional regulations of federally-backed S&Ls), it would
hinder both the OTS’ mandate to provide a stable and uniform system
of national regulation and could deter growth in the industry by
forcing S&Ls to contend with a plethora or national and state

215

Bill Gross, Beware our Shadow Banking System, FORTUNE,
http://money.cnn.com/2007/11/27/newsmakers/gross_banking.fortune/index.htm?po
stversion=2007112807 (last modified Nov. 28, 2007). An example would be
collateralized debt obligations—the method by which prime and sub-prime loans
were “repackaged” and sold.
216
Id; compare BERNANKE, supra note 5, at 62-64.
217
See generally BENJAMIN BERNANKE, ESSAYS ON THE GREAT DEPRESSION
(2d prtg. 2004); see also Economics Focus: When to Bail Out, supra note 209, at 90.
218
12 U.S.C. § 1463(a)(1) (2000).

306
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol3/iss1/10

32

Attaway: Cracking the Door to State Recovery from Federal Thrifts

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 3, Issue 1

Fall 2007

regulations.219 Those in favor of greater state regulation argue that if
the states are preempted from asserting any power over federal S&Ls
and the OTS has only limited enforcement authority, then consumers
have no recourse or recovery when S&Ls do commit civil torts.220 The
lack of private causes of action provides incentive for S&Ls to
maximize profits with little or no concern for the consumer.221
The days of little or no regulation are well behind the United
States. Banks and the federal government have entered into a
“regulatory pact”—the federal government agrees to guarantee a
bank’s deposits and in return, the bank submits to regulation.222
Similarly, the central banks in the United States and other countries
have successfully fought inflation for much of the past thirty years—
leading to complacency and a belief that inflation will stay low and the
central banks will step in whenever there is trouble.223 But the United
States is still a vast territory with widely diverse economies—at best,
federal regulations are a compromise and are not what will work best
in all situations.
Perhaps most interestingly, according to many modern
macroeconomists, the current financial climate looks eerily similar to
the climate that supposedly triggered the Great Depression.224 In the
1920’s, consumers increasingly tapped home equity and credit because
the money was easily available.225 When the stock market crashed and
prices began to destabilize, those same consumers were spooked and
also began to devote proportionately more money to their debt
219

Wilmarth, supra note 104, at 285-86, see also 12 U.S.C. §§ 1463(a),
1464(a) (2000).
220
See generally Fisher, supra note 208; In re Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC
Mortgage Servicing Litig., 491 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2007).
221
Economics Focus: When to Bail Out, supra note 209, at 90; CSI: Credit
Crunch, ECONOMIST, Oct. 20, 2007, A Special Report on the World Economy 3, at
6-7 (noting that regulations that do not ensure financial consequences “encourages
excessive risk-taking”).
222
Economics Focus: When to Bail Out, supra note 209, at 90.
223
See generally Heroes of the Zeroes, ECONOMIST, Oct. 20, 2007, Special
Report on the World Economy 8, at 8-16.
224
See generally BERNANKE, supra note 199.
225
BERNANKE, supra note 5, at 46.
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repayments.226 With less money to spend on discretionary purchases,
demand declined and credit tightened, which caused further
deflation.227 Similarly, banks were afraid of runs and insolvency, and
thus held more money in reserve and lent money to only the most
credit-worthy customers.228
Part of Congress’ intent in enacting HOLA was to standardize
lending practices to specifically avoid speculative lending and to
restore the banking industry to solid footing.229 Arguably, HOLA and
the OTS managed to do just that, and, with the help of the Federal
Reserve, managed the U.S. economy fairly well. However, by the end
of the century, lending credit standards were once again irrationally
loose.230 Headlines for much of 2007 have been concerned with the
fact that the average United States consumer had—for the first time in
history—a negative savings rate and the effect that exotic loans and
easy credit will have now that housing prices are deflating and credit is
“crunched.”231 In England, for the first time in approximately 150
years, there was a run on a bank.232 All these factors contribute to a
feeling that the world economy is fragile, although it is unlikely that
America or the world would see another Great Depression. The fact
that Congress is once again talking about a bailout of consumers for
defaulting mortgages shows that, at some level, HOLA and the OTS
failed to adequately regulate the system.
There are other interests as well, however, and the consumer is
only one side of the coin. Banks and federal S&Ls are, at the end of
the day, businesses and as such need an incentive to actually operate—
primarily profits. Forcing federal S&Ls to comply with a myriad of
state regulations as well as federal regulations runs the risk of creating
an overregulated industry and could create excessive litigation that
226

Id.
Id.
228
See id. at 62-65. During this period, even people with good credit who were
a low credit risk found it increasingly difficult to get loans and mortgages. Id.
229
12 U.S.C. §§ 1463(a), 1464(a) (2000).
230
CSI: Credit Crunch, supra note 221, at 6-7.
231
Id. at 6.
232
Id. at 8.
227
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would discourage S&Ls from operating, lessen competition, and
generally harm the economy as a whole.
This still leaves us with whether the Seventh Circuit managed to
strike an appropriate balance that will maximize both judicial and
economic efficiency across the spectrum of players and what
implications the court’s new approach to banking regulation is likely
to have on regulatory enforcement within the court’s jurisdiction. It
seems likely that, on the whole, the court managed to find a workable
balance between state and federal regulation. The court’s analysis of
the claims makes clear that it is willing to allow states at least some
regulatory authority.233 It appears that the court feels that the states,
and not the federal government, is best able to determine how to
protect the interests of its citizens and that, at any rate, federal
protection is inadequate.234 The state law claims that the court allows
(i.e. fraud, breach of contract, etc.) are claims that are typically
associated with “bad actors” in business.235 Banks are the engines of
capitalism, but they are still businesses—and, like any business,
should be answerable to their customers.
Banks are central to the economy, but they occupy a unique
position—the federal government insures their deposits to provide the
general population with the security of knowing their money will
always be available, but this insurance also means that banks are free
to take greater risks with those deposits.236 The federal government
will bail them out if their loans go bad and they fail to meet their
233

See generally In re Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC Mortgage Servicing Litig.,
491 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2007).
234
See generally In re Ocwen II, 491 F.3d 638; see also On Credit Watch,
ECONOMIST, Oct. 20, 2007, Special Report on the World Economy 3, at 26-34
(arguing that lending regulation is to blame for much of the credit crunch in 2007
and that updates to the regulatory scheme are needed to avoid future economic
crises); Bill Gross, Beware our Shadow Banking System, FORTUNE,
http://money.cnn.com/2007/11/27/newsmakers/gross_banking.fortune/index.htm?po
stversion=2007112807 (last modified Nov. 28, 2007) (arguing that much of the
threat to the banking system results from no regulation of risky investments, such as
collateralized debt obligations).
235
See generally In re Ocwen II, 491 F.3d 638.
236
Economics Focus: When to Bail Out,supra note 209, at 90.
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obligations.237 Thus, even though there is federal regulation, the
system encourages banks to take ever larger risks, often at the expense
of their consumers and sometimes without being honest about their
true motives. By allowing state law claims that implicate good
business practices, the Seventh Circuit attempts to correct for the
above market distortion. Forcing banks to be more accountable to
their consumers makes them less likely to engage in questionable
business practices out of fear of litigation. Here, the Seventh Circuit
seems to have struck an appropriate balance between ensuring that
American thrifts can compete with foreign banks and ensuring that
they are not given free reign to run amok.
PART IV: CONCLUSION
For good or ill, Judge Posner is a paragon of the Chicago School
of legal reasoning and is widely recognized as a staunch proponent of
using the law to create economic efficiency. Here, Judge Posner seems
at his best. He holds as clearly preempted those statutes and common
law actions that could lead to conflicting state and federal regulations
or that may encroach on the efficacy of the federal regulations.238 At
the same time, his fluid application of what it means to incidentally
affect lending operations provides consumers with the one thing
HOLA and the OTS lack, private causes of action against bad acting
S&Ls. The courts have indicated which types of claims it feels should
be allowed, and that, unlike many other courts, it will allow some
measure of consumer protection. Ultimately, this will strengthen the
banking system by making S&Ls more accountable to their customers
and less likely to zealously advocate exotic or risky loans without full
disclosure. In short, the Seventh Circuit’s compromise sacrifices short
term gain for long term growth.
The test articulated by the court redraws the lines of when, and
how, the OTS can preempt state law actions. Judge Posner and the
court have made it easier for plaintiffs to bring actions against S&Ls
237

See generally Lessons from the Credit Crunch, ECONOMIST, Oct. 20, 2007,
Special Report on the World Economy.
238
In re Ocwen II, 491 F.3d at 645-48.
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by allowing them to recover for claims based on state laws that come
from a vital state interest.239 Although not all claims may go forward,
even under this rubric, it is significantly less deferential than past
precedent. It does not dismiss the state law claims out of hand. It also
provides—through the courts—an important check on the power of a
single regulatory agency to set policy with impunity.
The degree to which those state law claims are allowed to move
forward will depend on how courts choose to interpret the OTS’
assertion that it can preempt almost all state law. If more courts follow
the less deferential position of the Seventh Circuit, the overall benefit
may be that banks are less reliant on the government and are
ultimately healthier institutions. Allowing at least some state law
claims to go forward will force banks to become more accountable to
their ultimate consumer, the American people. The Seventh Circuit has
started down the path to ensuring that, like other businesses, banks
must answer to those whom they serve.

239

Id. at 643-45.
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